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Background. Pathological gambling (PG) is a form of behavioural addiction that has been associated with elevated
impulsivity and also cognitive distortions in the processing of chance, probability and skill. We sought to assess the
relationship between the level of cognitive distortions and state and trait measures of impulsivity in treatment-
seeking pathological gamblers.
Method. Thirty pathological gamblers attending the National Problem Gambling Clinic, the ﬁrst National Health
Service clinic for gambling problems in the UK, were compared with 30 healthy controls in a case-control design.
Cognitive distortions were assessed using the Gambling-Related Cognitions Scale (GRCS). Trait impulsivity was
assessed using the UPPS-P, which includes scales of urgency, the tendency to be impulsive in positive or negative
mood states. Delay discounting rates were taken as a state measure of impulsive choice.
Results. Pathological gamblers had elevated impulsivity on several UPPS-P subscales but eﬀect sizes were largest
(Cohen’s d>1.4) for positive and negative urgency. The pathological gamblers also displayed higher levels of
gambling distortions, and elevated preference for immediate rewards, compared to controls. Within the pathological
gamblers, there was a strong relationship between the preference for immediate rewards and the level of cognitive
distortions (R
2=0.41).
Conclusions. Impulsive choice in the gamblers was correlated with the level of gambling distortions, and we
hypothesize that an impulsive decision-making style may increase the acceptance of erroneous beliefs during
gambling play.
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Introduction
Gambling is a recreational activity that becomes dis-
ordered in approximately 0.9% of the British popu-
lation using DSM criteria (Wardle et al. 2010). There is
extensive clinical and pathophysiological overlap be-
tween pathological gambling (PG) and the substance
use disorders (Potenza, 2006; Frascella et al. 2010),
prompting a probable reclassiﬁcation of PG among the
addictions in the forthcoming DSM-V (Mitzner et al.
2010; Bowden-Jones & Clark, in press). PG is thought
to arise through a combination of biological, social and
psychological risk factors (Blaszczynski & Nower,
2002; Sharpe, 2002). One of the deﬁning features of
gamblers’ cognition is the tendency to overestimate
the chances of winning, due to variety of cognitive
distortions in the processing of chance, skill and
probability (Ladouceur & Walker, 1996; Clark, 2010).
Indeed, it is unclear whether these distortions have an
obvious parallel in substance use disorders (Xian et al.
2008). Using psychometric measures of gambling dis-
tortions, such as the Gambling-Related Cognitions
Scale (GRCS; Raylu & Oei, 2004a) or the Gambling
Beliefs Questionnaire (GBQ; Steenbergh et al. 2002),
several studies have reported elevated levels of dis-
torted cognitions in individuals with disordered
gambling compared to those without gambling prob-
lems (Miller & Currie, 2008; Emond & Marmurek,
2010; Myrseth et al. 2010). These cognitions are atte-
nuated by treatment (Breen et al. 2001), and higher
baseline scores predicted poorer outcome in a
Gambler’s Anonymous programme (Oei & Gordon,
2008).
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ORIGINAL ARTICLEStudies using personality measures and neuro-
cognitive tests have also highlighted changes in im-
pulsivity in PG. Scores on the Barratt Impulsivity
Scale and the Eysenck Impulsivity Venturesomeness
Empathy (IVE) scale reliably increased in case-control
studies (Blaszczynski et al. 1997; Petry, 2001b; Nower
et al. 2004; Lawrence et al. 2009a), and prospective
studies have conﬁrmed that high impulsivity during
adolescence predicts later gambling problems (Vitaro
et al. 1999; Slutske et al. 2005). Rather than being a
unidimensional construct, impulsivity is being in-
creasingly viewed as a constellation of traits, including
a lack of planning or forethought, reduced persever-
ance and the seeking of novel or intense sensory ex-
periences (Evenden, 1999; Verdejo-Garcia et al. 2008).
Recent research has also identiﬁed a fourth im-
pulsivity component, labelled ‘urgency’: the tendency
to engage in impulsive acts during intense mood
states. This construct was initially identiﬁed by
Whiteside & Lynam (2001) using a composite of the
Barratt and Eysenck scales and the Zuckerman
Sensation Seeking Scale, and subsequent work by
Cyders, Smith and colleagues (Cyders & Smith, 2008b)
has distinguished positive and negative aspects of ur-
gency. The urgency construct is profoundly relevant to
gambling behaviour, as it is known that many gam-
blers are motivated to gamble to alleviate states of
depression, stress or boredom (Jacobs, 1986), but sim-
ultaneously, positive mood (perhaps associated with
hypomania or dramatic wins) may also prompt gam-
bling sprees (Cummins et al. 2009; Lloyd et al. 2010).
Although positive and negative urgency are moder-
ately correlated and both are related to a range of risky
behaviours (Cyders & Smith, 2008b), there are some
diﬀerential eﬀects. Positive urgency predicted longi-
tudinal increases in gambling behaviour across uni-
versity (Cyders & Smith, 2008a), and changes in risk
taking and alcohol consumption following positive
mood induction (Cyders et al. 2010), whereas negative
urgency is associated with bulimic symptoms (Anestis
et al. 2007) and tobacco cravings (Billieux et al. 2007).
Impulsivity can also be assessed in the laboratory
using a variety of neurocognitive tasks. The delay
discounting paradigm assesses impulsive choice by
presenting a series of decisions between a smaller re-
ward available soon (or immediately), and larger re-
wards available after a longer delay (Bickel & Marsch,
2001; Reynolds, 2006). Indiﬀerence points obtained
from varying one of the decision parameters (e.g. the
delay to the larger reward) can be ﬁtted to a hyperbolic
discounting curve, allowing derivation of a parameter
k that indicates the steepness of the discounting func-
tion. Impulsive subjects show enhanced preference for
the smaller immediate rewards and steeper discount-
ing of delayed outcomes (i.e. higher k values), and
several studies have described such a tendency in
treatment-seeking and community groups with dis-
ordered gambling (Petry, 2001a; Alessi & Petry, 2003;
Dixon et al. 2003; Ledgerwood et al. 2009).
Although impulsivity and gambling-related cogni-
tive distortions have been described in pathological
gamblers, the links between these constructs has
received minimal attention. In an undergraduate
sample comprising a range of gambling problems, the
Eysenck Impulsivity score predicted higher scores
on the GBQ (MacKillop et al. 2006), and a similar re-
lationship was reported between Barratt scores and a
measure of cognitive distortions that apply across
many forms of psychopathology, such as personaliza-
tion of negative events and all-or-none thinking
(Mobini et al. 2007). We reasoned that an impulsive
style of decision making may increase a gambler’s
tendency to accept erroneous beliefs about gambling
over more ‘rational’ alternative interpretations that
reﬂect more accurately the nature of chance. As such,
the primary focus of the present study was to assess
the degree of coupling between gambling-related
cognitive distortions and state and trait indices of
impulsivity, in participants with PG. Gamblers were
recruited through the National Problem Gambling
Clinic in London, which is the ﬁrst (and only) National
Health Service treatment facility for gambling in the
UK. Given the limited treatment facilities for gambling
prior to the opening of the clinic in 2008, there are
few data available on the clinical characteristics and
preferred forms of gambling of treatment-seeking
gamblers in the UK, and it is vital to study gambling at
a national level given the pronounced cultural and
legislative heterogeneity in gambling practices across
countries (Raylu & Oei, 2004b). A secondary objective
was therefore to replicate prior ﬁndings, primarily
from Australian and North American studies, of in-
creased levels of gambling distortions, self-reported
impulsivity, and discounting of delayed rewards
in PG.
Method
Participants
Pathological gamblers (n=30) were recruited from the
National Problem Gambling Clinic (28 males, two
females; mean age=40.1 years, S.D.=12.3, range 21–60)
and compared with community-recruited healthy
controls (28 males, two females; mean age=35.8 years,
S.D.=12.2, range 19–60). The protocol was approved
by the Cambridge Local Research Ethics Committee
(09/H0305/77) and all volunteers provided written
informed consent. Participants were reimbursed for
their time and travel expenses. The two groups did not
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(t=1.42, p=0.160) or errors committed on the National
Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson & Willison, 1991),
which provides an estimate of verbal IQ (t=1.31,
p=0.190). Inclusion criteria for the PG group were:
DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for PG, and age 18–60
years. PG was conﬁrmed using the Massachusetts
Gambling Screen (MAGS; Shaﬀer et al. 1994), which
indexes the DSM-IV criteria, in conjunction with a
score of o8 on the Problem Gambling Severity Index
(PGSI; Ferris & Wynne, 2001). Exclusion criteria
for both groups were: history of neurological illness,
previous psychiatric hospitalization, current pharma-
cotherapy and signiﬁcant physical illness. Among
the controls, 27 had a PGSI score of 0 and had
never gambled; two scored 1 on the PGSI and one
scored 2.
The PG participants were recruited as a con-
venience sample, and comprised three subgroups in
terms of their treatment proﬁle: 15 gamblers (50%)
were tested prior to receiving any treatment, seven
(23%) were currently receiving treatment and eight
(27%) had recently completed a 10-session course of
cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). In the PG group,
the presence of other current and lifetime diagnoses
of mental illness was assessed by a semi-structured
interview using the ICD-10, in conjunction with
the computerized version of the Mini International
Neuropsychiatric Interview (e-MINI; Medical Out-
come Systems, USA) (Sheehan et al. 1998). Any dis-
crepancies between these measures were resolved
through discussion with the lead psychiatrist (H.B.J.)
and further review of the medical records. Ten cases
met current or lifetime diagnoses of major depressive
disorder (six current, four lifetime). Two cases re-
corded current generalized anxiety disorder. For sub-
stance use disorders, one case met lifetime cannabis
dependence, one case lifetime alcohol dependence,
and two cases current alcohol dependence. The
healthy controls recorded no lifetime or current
mental health problems on the e-MINI screen.
The various forms of gambling that were played
were assessed with a modiﬁed version of item 1 from
the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur &
Blume, 1987); in addition, the PG participants were
asked which form they considered most problematic
for them. Sixty per cent of the PG group considered
ﬁxed odds betting terminals (FOBTs) to represent their
problematic form of gambling. The other preferred
games were sports betting (16%), internet poker or
blackjack (7%), slot machines (10%), and casino games
(7%). Convergent data were obtained from games
played once a week or more (SOGS item 1) (individual
participants may endorse more than one form, so the
total does not sum to 100%): gaming machines (59%),
betting on horses (52%), lottery (41%), sports betting
(38%), card games (24%), casino games (17%), bingo
(7%), bowling/pool (7%) or stock market (3%). In
examining the relationship status of the participants,
the modal status in the PG group was single (50%),
30% were in a steady relationship, 13% were married
and 7% were divorced. Among controls, the modal
status was married (47%), with 23% single, 17% in a
steady relationship, 10% divorced and 3% widowed.
Both groups were predominately of British nationality
(PG: 97%; controls: 88%). Employment status was
similar in both groups; in the PG group, 61% were
employed full time, 7% students, 10% self-employed,
3% retired and 17% unemployed. In the controls,
43% were employed full time, 17% students, 3% self-
employed, 17% unemployed and 13% in part-time
employment. The PG group rated the largest amount
of money gambled in a single day, on a four-point
scale: £10–£100 (6%), £100–£1000 (17%), £1000–£10000
(60%), over £10000 (17%). Current level of debt
ranged from £0 to £80000: 23% had no debt due to
bail-out; in the gamblers with current debt, this debt
ranged from £600 to £80000 (mean £25557).
Procedure
All participants attended a single test session in a quiet
laboratory or treatment room, where they completed a
cognitive assessment and questionnaire measures of
clinical and personality measures.
Kirby Monetary Choice Questionnaire
(MCQ; Kirby et al. 1999)
The MCQ is a measure of delay discounting compris-
ing 27 hypothetical choices between a smaller reward
available immediately versus a larger reward available
at some point in the future (e.g. ‘Would you prefer £15
today or £35 in 13 days?’). The larger reward varies
across three levels of magnitude: small (£25–£35),
medium (£50–£60) and large (£75–£80), deriving three
k values that were averaged for the overall discounting
rate. Given that the k parameter assumes an under-
lying hyperbolic discounting curve, an area under the
curve (AUC) value was also extracted for each par-
ticipant, as a parameter that is neutral to the under-
lying discounting function (Myerson et al. 2001).
UPPS-P Impulsive Behaviour Scale (Cyders et al. 2007)
This is a 59-item self-report questionnaire using a
Likert scale from 1 (I agree strongly) to 4 (I disagree
strongly) to assess ﬁve impulsivity subscales:
Negative Urgency (e.g. ‘Sometimes when I feel bad,
I can’t seem to stop what I am doing even though it is
making me feel worse’); Positive Urgency (e.g. ‘When
overjoyed, I feel like I can’t stop myself from going
Gambling distortions and impulsivity 2627overboard’); (lack of) Planning (e.g. ‘I usually
make up my mind through careful reasoning’ –
negative loading); (lack of) Perseverance (e.g. ‘I ﬁnish
what I start’ – negative loading); and Sensation
Seeking (e.g. ‘I would enjoy the sensation of skiing
very fast down a high mountain slope’).
GRCS (Raylu & Oei, 2004a)
The GRCS a 23-item self-report questionnaire using a
seven-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to
7 (strongly agree) to assess ﬁve subscales: Predictive
Control (e.g. ‘Losses when gambling are bound to be
followed by a series of wins’); Illusion of Control (e.g.
‘I have speciﬁc rituals and behaviours that increase
my chances of winning’); Interpretive Bias (e.g.
‘Relating my winnings to my skill and ability makes
me continue gambling’); Gambling Expectancies (e.g.
‘Gambling makes things seem better’); and Inability
to Stop (e.g. ‘I’m not strong enough to stop
gambling’).
Statistical analysis
Statistical analyses were implemented in SPSS version
17 (SPSS Inc., USA). A natural log transformation was
applied to the discounting k values, to improve suit-
ability for parametric analysis. Visual inspection of the
discounting data led to exclusion of three participants’
scores on this measure (one PG, two controls), who
uniformly selected the larger reward across all delay
(i.e. the pre-speciﬁed delays and amounts on the
MCQ failed to isolate indiﬀerence points for these
participants). Group comparisons on the GRCS and
UPPS-P were performed by entering the component
subscales into a multivariate ANOVA. A mixed-model
ANOVA was used to compare k discounting values,
with magnitude of the larger reward as a within-
subjects factor. Within the PG group, Pearson’s coef-
ﬁcients were used to assess univariate relationships
between the UPPS-P, GRCS and Kirby MCQ variables,
and a stepwise multiple linear regression assessed
possible additive contributions of the UPPS-P and
Kirby MCQ variables to predicting the level of
cognitive distortions (with GRCS as the dependent
variable).
Results
The PG group displayed a higher level of gambling-
related cognitions (F5,54=13.1, p<0.001), with signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerences on all of the GRCS subscales (see
Table 1). On the UPPS-P, the PG group displayed
elevated impulsivity (F5,54=10.0, p<0.001), with sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences on all subscales with the exception
of Sensation Seeking (see Table 1). Eﬀect sizes
(Cohen’s d) revealed stronger eﬀects for the two
urgency subscales (d=1.46–1.77) in comparison to the
narrow impulsivity subscales (d=0.61–0.78).
Choice behaviour on the delay discounting scale
was analysed using a mixed-model ANOVA of group
(PG, controls) by magnitude (small, medium, large).
The PG group displayed higher k values than healthy
controls (main eﬀect of group: F1,55=8.02, p=0.006),
indicating elevated impulsive choice in the PG group
(see Fig. 1). All participants showed higher k values
(steeper discounting) for smaller, compared to larger,
Table 1. Mean scores (S.D.) on the GRCS and UPPS-P Impulsivity Scale in the
participants with pathological gambling (PG) and healthy controls
PG Controls F Cohen’s d
GRCS
Predictive Control 9.4 (6.2) 6.1 (2.7) 7.29* 0.75
Illusion of Control 14.4 (6.8) 4.4 (0.9) 64.3** 2.59
Interpretive Bias 14.7 (7.1) 6.2 (3.5) 34.5** 0.80
Gambling Expectancies 13.9 (6.4) 5.7 (2.5) 43.3** 1.85
Inability to Stop 11.1 (5.5) 5.9 (2.9) 21.1** 1.24
Total score 69.8 (27.7) 30.6 (10.6)
UPPS-P
Negative Urgency 35.6 (6.4) 24.3 (6.4) 47.2** 1.77
Positive Urgency 35.9 (8.3) 23.9 (8.1) 31.8** 1.46
(Lack of) Planning 26.6 (5.9) 23.3 (4.7) 5.58* 0.78
(Lack of) Perseverance 23.0 (5.6) 19.1 (4.3) 9.07* 0.61
Sensation Seeking 33.4 (5.9) 34.7 (6.9) 0.68 0.20
GRCS, Gambling-Related Cognitions Scale; S.D., standard deviation.
ANOVA degrees of freedom 1, 59.
*p<0.05, ** p<0.005.
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consistent with a typical ‘magnitude eﬀect’ (e.g.
Chapman, 1996), and suggests that the PG participants
are using similar cognitive mechanisms for making
these inter-temporal decisions to the healthy controls.
There was no interaction of group by magnitude
(F1,55=0.894, p=0.412). In addition, the PG and
healthy controls diﬀered on the AUC measure for the
discounting function (t55=2.3, p=0.025), a parameter
that does not assume any underlying mathematical
function. The AUC values are displayed in Table 2,
alongside the untransformed k scores for comparison
with previous studies with the MCQ.
We examined univariate associations between
delay discounting (average k), UPPS-P impulsivity
and GRCS scores in the PG group. In keeping with
previous work (e.g. Kirby et al. 1999; Mobini et al.
2007; Koﬀ & Lucas, 2011), moderate associations were
observed between the delay discounting rates and
self-reported impulsivity (UPPS-P), with the highest
coeﬃcients observed on Lack of Planning (r=0.376,
p=0.044) and Lack of Perseverance (r=0.382,
p=0.041). A strong correlation was observed between
impulsive choice on the delay discounting scale and
the level of gambling cognitions (see Fig. 2), explaining
41% of the variance in the total GRCS score. Each
of the GRCS subscale correlations was statistically
signiﬁcant (see Table 3). In light of a previous study
showing that gambling distortions are attenuated by
psychological treatment (Breen et al. 2001), we ob-
served no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the GRCS scores in
the three PG subgroups at diﬀerent stages of treat-
ment: pre-treatment group, mean GRCS=74.6 (S.D.=
20.9); during treatment group, mean GRCS=71.4
(S.D.=37.2); post-treatment group, mean GRCS=59.5
(S.D.=30.6, F2,27=0.78, p=0.469). Notably, the corre-
lation between the discount rate and the GRCS total
remained highly signiﬁcant after controlling for stage
of treatment (partial coeﬃcient r=0.612, p=0.001).
UPPS-P impulsivity was less clearly associated with
the level of cognitive distortions in the PG group:
Negative and Positive Urgency were both associated
with Illusion of Control, and Positive Urgency was
additionally correlated with the Gambling Expect-
ancies and Inability to Stop subscales, and the GRCS
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Fig. 1. Delay discounting (ln k) on the Monetary Choice
Questionnaire (MCQ), in patients with pathological
gambling (PG) and healthy controls (HC). Errors bars
indicate standard error of the mean.
Table 2. Untransformed delay discounting measures on the
Monetary Choice Questionnaire (MCQ), in the participants with
pathological gambling (PG) and healthy controls
PG Controls
k score
Large 0.0198 (0.0224) 0.0093 (0.0138)
Medium 0.0268 (0.0406) 0.0133 (0.0169)
Small 0.0398 (0.0459) 0.0192 (0.2310)
AUC value 0.503 (0.214) 0.642 (0.241)
AUC, Area under the curve.
Values given as mean (standard deviation).
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Fig. 2. Delay discounting (ln k scores, averaged across the
three magnitude levels) is correlated signiﬁcantly with total
score on the Gambling-Related Cognitions Scale (GRCS), in
the pathological gamblers.
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scales added signiﬁcantly to the discounting rates
in the prediction of gambling distortions, a stepwise
multiple regression model was run with the total
GRCS score as the dependent variable, and the delay
discounting rate, Positive Urgency and Negative
Urgency as predictors. The k score was the only vari-
able retained in the model as a signiﬁcant predictor of
the level of cognitive distortions (R
2=0.415, overall
F1,27=19.1, p<0.001, k b=0.64). (The same conclusion
was drawn using a hierarchical regression with the
discounting rate entered at the ﬁrst step and the
Urgency scores entered at the second step: there was
no signiﬁcant change in the R
2 between the two steps;
overall R
2=0.481.) We also explored the relationships
between delay discounting (average k) and the GRCS
score and UPPS-P subscales in the healthy controls.
The total GRCS scores displayed moderate variability
in the controls (minimum=23, maximum=60) and, as
in the PG, impulsive choice on the delay discounting
measure was predictive of the level of gambling dis-
tortions (r=0.431, p=0.022). The correlations between
delay discounting and the UPPS-P subscales were not
signiﬁcant in the controls, although the coeﬃcients for
Negative (r=0.20) and Positive (r=0.34) Urgency, and
Lack of Planning (r=0.21), were comparable to the
strength of relationships observed in previous studies
(Kirby et al. 1999; Mobini et al. 2007; Koﬀ & Lucas,
2011).
Discussion
The present study is the ﬁrst UK study to describe
clinical and psychological data in treatment-seeking
PG. A convenience sample of 30 gamblers recruited
from the National Problem Gambling Clinic were
predominantly male, well-educated (48% had entered
higher education), and typically in full-time employ-
ment (61%). As expected, these gamblers participated
in a range of games, with the preferred form of
gambling being FOBTs in some 60% of the sample.
These gaming machines (now known as category B2
gaming machines) are characterized by high stakes,
high jackpots, and a rapid rate of play, and are a
relatively new arrival on the UK gambling landscape.
Although the national prevalence of FOBT play was
low (4%) in the 2010 British Gambling Prevalence
Survey (Wardle et al. 2010), FOBT play was the third
most common form of gambling among the problem
gamblers recruited in that survey (in 9%). Our data
further highlight the attractiveness of these games in a
treatment-seeking group with PG.
The major ﬁnding in the present dataset was of a
relationship between impulsive choice on the delay
discounting task and the level of gambling-related
cognitive distortions. This was a particularly strong
eﬀect in the PG group, where discounting scores ex-
plained 41% of the variability in gambling distortions,
and it was also observed at a signiﬁcant level (19%
shared variance) in the healthy controls. Group dif-
ferences in impulsivity, and inaccurate beliefs about
skill, chance and probability, are widely recognized in
the literature on problem gambling, but the relation-
ship between these putative aetiological mechanisms
has received little attention. Our ﬁndings support a
previous study in student gamblers (MacKillop et al.
2006), where the GBQ was correlated moderately
(r=0.40) with Eysenck Impulsivity scores. We extend
these ﬁndings into a treatment-seeking PG sample,
and demonstrate that a state measure of impulsive
choice is the stronger predictor of gambling distor-
tions than self-reported impulsivity. This close linkage
illustrates that gamblers with more ‘myopic’ (i.e.
focused on the present) decision making and a reduced
capacity to defer gratiﬁcation are more susceptible to
the diverse range of complex distortions that occur
during play, such as beliefs in superstitions and rituals
(GRCS Illusion of Control), the failure to appreciate
Table 3. Univariate correlations (Pearson’s r) between the delay discounting (Kirby k; n=29), Gambling-Related Cognitions Scale
(GRCS)( n=30) and UPPS-P (n=30) in the pathological gamblers
Negative
Urgency
Positive
Urgency
Lack of
Planning
Lack of
Perseverance
Sensation
Seeking Kirby k
GRCS total 0.315 0.395* 0.289 0.184 0.122 0.644**
Illusion of Control 0.492** 0.497** 0.244 0.080 0.079 0.460*
Predictive Control 0.027 0.013 0.071 0.204 0.184 0.378*
Interpretive Bias 0.196 0.177 0.306 0.250 0.267 0.525**
Gambling Expectancies 0.254 0.413* 0.231 0.100 x0.197 0.566**
Inability to Stop 0.204 0.366* 0.223 0.115 0.147 0.581**
Kirby k 0.284 0.345 0.376* 0.382* 0.113 –
*p<0.05, ** p<0.005.
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expectancies that gambling will be exciting and/or
relieve negative aﬀect (GRCS Gambling Expectancies)
(Toneatto et al. 1997; Raylu & Oei, 2004a). Indeed,
delay discounting was signiﬁcantly associated with all
ﬁve of the GRCS subscale scores in the PG group.
Many of these distortions can also be elicited in
healthy, non-problem gamblers (Clark, 2010), and we
saw that discounting rates were also predictive of
GRCS scores in the healthy controls. We have reported
previously that individual diﬀerences on the GRCS
predicted neural responses to gambling ‘near-misses’
in healthy non-gamblers (Clark et al. 2009).
We were able to replicate several group diﬀer-
ences reported previously in Australian and North
American studies. First, the PG group reported more
cognitive distortions on the GRCS, with signiﬁcant
group diﬀerences on each of the ﬁve subscales (Raylu
& Oei, 2004a; Emond & Marmurek, 2010). Prospective
data do not yet exist to arbitrate whether these cogni-
tions predate the onset of problem gambling, or occur
as a consequence of long-term gambling. Second,
the PG group displayed elevated impulsivity on the
UPPS-P questionnaire. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences were
observed on the two subscales of ‘narrow’ impulsivity
(Lack of Premeditation and Lack of Perseverance) and
also on the two Urgency subscales, but the eﬀect sizes
for the Urgency subscales were considerably larger.
This is the ﬁrst study to diﬀerentiate Positive Urgency
and Negative Urgency in treatment-seeking PG, and
our ﬁndings clearly emphasize the relevance of these
constructs to PG. By inference, impulsive acts in
problem gamblers may predominantly arise through
an interaction with current aﬀective state, perhaps
through impaired emotion regulation mechanisms
(Billieux et al. 2010; Cyders et al. 2010). Although
Positive and Negative Urgency scales were correlated
in the present data, it remains to be seen whether
positive or negative mood states represent distinct
pathways to risk taking in individual gamblers
(Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002). We observed no group
diﬀerences in sensation seeking, consistent with
some (Blaszczynski et al. 1986; Parke et al. 2004;
Ledgerwood et al. 2009) but not all (Cunningham-
Williams et al. 2005) previous studies in PG. This may
reﬂect the exclusively male sample (Nower et al. 2004),
or it is possible that sensation seeking can be de-
composed further into subfactors, such as boredom
proneness, some of which may be associated with PG
(Fortune & Goodie, 2010). Alternatively, sensation
seeking may dispose recreational engagement with
gambling rather than the transition to disordered
gambling, and may therefore have less relevance to
adult treatment-seeking groups (cf. van Leeuwen et al.
2010).
Finally, there were signiﬁcant diﬀerences in delay
discounting between the two groups, in addition to
the individual diﬀerences seen on this measure. Both
groups showed the standard ‘magnitude eﬀect’ on
the discounting task, such that large rewards of a
relatively higher value (£75–£85) were discounted
less than large rewards of a relatively smaller value
(£25–£35). This is a consistent ﬁnding in the behav-
ioural economics literature (Chapman, 1996; Green &
Myerson, 2004), and, as in the original study using this
measure in heroin addicts (Kirby et al. 1999), the
magnitude eﬀect did not interact with group status:
participants with PG showed similar sensitivity to re-
ward magnitude to the controls. Steeper discounting
on the Kirby MCQ procedure replicates previous work
in PG using other variants of the delay discounting
paradigm (Petry, 2001a; Alessi & Petry, 2003; Dixon
et al. 2003; MacKillop et al. 2006; Ledgerwood et al.
2009), and patients with Parkinson’s disease with
medication-induced PG also show steeper delay dis-
counting than controls with Parkinson’s disease on
the MCQ (Housden et al. 2010). The discount rates in
the PG group were correlated signiﬁcantly with the
UPPS-P subscales of ‘narrow’ impulsivity. This is in
keeping with past personality studies in the general
population, which primarily ﬁnd an association with
the Barratt non-planning subscale (Kirby et al. 1999;
Mobini et al. 2007; Koﬀ & Lucas, 2011). Although
statistically signiﬁcant in the larger studies, it is likely
that this state–trait relationship is of only modest
strength (rB0.3) because of the distinct sources of
variability in the two measures: one is an introspective
evaluation of generalized impulsive tendencies and
the other is a state measure involving a series of
ﬁnancial decisions.
Some limitations should be noted. First, the present
sample was composed of only treatment-seeking PG,
and ﬁndings may not generalize to all levels of dis-
ordered gambling (although see MacKillop et al. 2006),
and our convenience sample included a mixture
of cases tested before, during and after treatment. It
was reported previously that ratings of gambling dis-
tortions are reduced by a course of psychotherapy
(Breen et al. 2001), although such an eﬀect was not
statistically signiﬁcant in our data, possibly because
the CBT programme did not place a strong emphasis
on the correction of speciﬁc gambling distortions.
Nonetheless, the association with delay discounting
remained highly signiﬁcant when partialling for stage
of treatment. Second, in this restricted sample we did
not exclude participants with some of the common
clinical co-morbidities with PG, including mood dis-
orders and substance use disorders, which may
be associated with impulsivity and discounting
tendencies (Reynolds, 2006; Takahashi et al. 2008;
Gambling distortions and impulsivity 2631Dombrovski et al. 2011). We note that the rate of sub-
stance use disorder co-morbidity was relatively low
compared to international data in treatment-seeking
PG (Ramirez et al. 1983; Black & Moyer, 1998), and
we did not examine the additive impact of these co-
morbidities on psychological functioning (e.g. Petry,
2001a) for reasons of statistical power.
Previous studies have described associations be-
tween facets of impulsivity and gambling severity
(Steel & Blaszczynski, 1998; Krueger et al. 2005),
physiological arousal during gambling (Anderson &
Brown, 1984; Krueger et al. 2005), and short-term
treatment outcomes (Leblond et al. 2003; Goudriaan
et al. 2008). The present work highlights mood-related
impulsivity (‘urgency’) and delay discounting as es-
pecially relevant facets in gambling behaviour. The
correlation between delay discounting and gambling
distortions may indeed shed further light on the
nature of these faulty cognitions in disordered gam-
bling. Previous work eliciting gambling distortions with
the ‘think aloud’ technique has reported high rates
of erroneous verbalizations even in non-problem-
atic regular players (Ladouceur & Walker, 1996;
Delfabbro, 2004), and it was not until psychometric
measures such as the GRCS and GBQ were developed
that the elevated level of distortions in PG became
evident (Raylu & Oei, 2004a; Emond & Marmurek,
2010; Myrseth et al. 2010). However, it remains unclear
from the psychometric scales whether increased scores
reﬂect the frequency of these cognitions, the conviction
with which the beliefs are held, or the tendency to use
these beliefs to justify excessive gambling (Ladouceur
& Walker, 1996; Delfabbro, 2004). Measures of im-
pulsivity, and the delay discounting paradigm most
speciﬁcally, capture the conﬂict between short-term
gratiﬁcation and longer-term gains. The resolution of
these inter-temporal decisions recruits neural regions,
including the ventral striatum and ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex (McClure et al. 2004; Hariri et al. 2006;
Sellitto et al. 2010), that are implicated in the patho-
physiology of problem gambling (Potenza et al. 2003;
Reuter et al. 2005; Lawrence et al. 2009b). These di-
lemmas may be analogous to the conﬂict that gamblers
experience between the rapid acceptance of a distorted
belief, versus a more deliberative, analytical appraisal
that their recent gambling results do not reﬂect skill,
luck or other common biases. Measures of impulsivity
including delay discounting were also seen to predict
more general Beckian cognitive distortions associated
with psychopathology in a student sample (Mobini
et al. 2006, 2007). Therefore, based on the link between
delay discounting and GRCS scores, we hypothesize
that the willingness to accept distorted gambling
thoughts over more rational explanations may be a
key pathological process in disordered gambling.
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